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ABSTRACT 
 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter, the DRC, DR Congo, or “Congo”) remains 
home to one of the largest humanitarian crises since the Second World War. As the largest and 
longest-running UN peacekeeping force in the organization’s history, the UN Stabilization 
Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) boasts a civilian protection record characterized by 
limited success. During the late 1990s, a series of peacekeeping failures inspired a series of 
scholarly critiques and UN reforms. International political will coalesced around the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). MONUSCO represents a test case for the operationalization of 
R2P. This paper analyzes UN Security Council Resolutions 2098 and 2147 and their impact on 
MONUSCO’s capacity to protect civilians in eastern DRC. Drawing on interviews with UN 
personnel and Congolese civilians, the paper constructs a case for the limited operational success 
of UNSC 2098 on measures of civilian protection. 
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Introduction 
With an estimated 5 to 6 million fatalities since 1994, the conflict in the eastern part of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) remains the world’s deadliest since the conclusion of 
the Second World War. MONUSCO, the mission in place in the DRC since 2010, remains the 
UN’s largest, most expensive, and longest-running peacekeeping force (MONUSCO 2014). 
MONUSCO’s ability to protect civilians – and thus prevent fatalities – is the subject of this 
paper. 
The geography of eastern Congo is complex and often unforgiving. At 2,344,858 square 
kilometers, the DRC is the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa and the eleventh largest country 
in the world. Nearly two-thirds of Congolese civilians live in remote rural areas, and dense 
vegetation in the DRC’s eastern provinces often provides shelter for armed groups (CIA World 
Factbook 2014). Given these realities, it comes as no surprise that MONUSCO demands a large 
share of UN peacekeeping resources. As MONUSCO possesses adequate numbers of personnel 
and the financial resources needed for meeting the demands of this challenging peacekeeping 
environment, the explanation for the mission’s shortcomings must be found elsewhere.  
While MONUSCO’s current mandate, which dates to UNSC Resolution 2098 (March 2013), 
lists four distinct objectives, this paper focuses on the first mission objective: the protection of 
Congolese civilians. The mandate aims to quell simmering violence in the DRC’s eastern 
provinces, conceptualized as North and South Kivu and Orientale. The UNSC reaffirmed 
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MONUSCO’s expanded authority under the 2013 mandate by issuing UNSC Resolution 2147 
(2014). This paper examines the extent to which greater peacekeeping latitude for MONUSCO 
translates into peace dividends for Congolese civilians. In doing so, I rely on a series of semi-
structured interviews with Congolese community members and UN staff (both foreign and 
Congolese).1 The interview excerpts offer insight into assessments of MONUSCO’s prior and 
current performance, and address the tangible impact of the 2013 resolution.  
To begin, I present the following question: to what extent has an increase in MONUSCO’s 
peacekeeping authority, as contained in UNSC Resolution 2098 (2013), translated into an 
increased capacity to protect civilians? In response, I argue that while assessments of 
MONUSCO do in fact reflect observable progress in the mission’s capacity to protect civilians, 
these capacity developments fall short of both the initial enthusiasm accompanying Resolution 
2098 and the “peace dividends” – measurable increases in civilian security – that might be 
reasonably expected in the nearly one and a half years between March 2013 and the time of data 
collection (June and July 2014). To explain the gap between the expected and observed progress, 
I contest that the mission possesses three key internal shortcomings that limit its ability to 
adequately fulfill its primary objective of protecting Congolese civilians. These limitations 
include lack of uniformity in the internalization of human rights norms among Congolese troops, 
a geographic mismatch between the concentration of violence and the concentration of 
MONUSCO resources, and lack of troop commitment at the individual level. A second argument 
addresses problems with the ways in which MONUSCO collaborates with the Congolese state. 
The mission’s collaborative efforts ultimately fail because UN staff prioritizes collaboration with 
Congolese political elites and government institutions at the expense of inclusive consultation 
with Congolese communities. 
 
Internal Limitations: MONUSCO’s Structural Failures 
The evolution of MONUSCO’s peacekeeping mandates parallels an evolution in the 
international peacekeeping conversation, reflecting a transition away from preventing violence 
between states and toward an imperative to protect individual civilians from human rights abuses 
committed by states and non-state actors (Goldstein 2011; ICISS 2001; Mansson 2005). 
MONUSCO’s current mandate, in placing unprecedented emphasis on the protection of civilians, 
represents the current manifestation of these evolving norms.  
In the 1990s, a series of large-scale peacekeeping failures sparked scholarly debate over the 
efficacy of the UN’s approach to conflict resolution. In 2001, the International Commission 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) contested that the problem with international 
peacekeeping lay not with a substandard organizational capacity, but with the UN’s failure to 
adapt to the changing dynamics of international violence in the twenty-first century (Goldstein 
2011; ICISS 2001). The Commission found that each state bore the primary responsibility for the 
protection of its citizens. If a state proved unable or unwilling to carry out this duty, however, it 
became the duty of the international community to provide the state in question with the support 
necessary to protect the rights of individuals within its borders (ICISS 2001).  
This new doctrine, referred to in international relations as the “Responsibility to Protect,” or 
R2P, evolved logically from the UN’s disappointing performance as a global protector of 
civilians (Bratt 1996; ICISS 2001). In a world in which an increasing percentage of civilians 
																																								 																				
1 All interviews were conducted by the author in the North and South Kivu provinces, from June 
to July 2014. 
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suffers atrocities at the hands of their own government and/or non-state actors, ICISS advocates 
for a paradigm shift in peacekeeping (Goldstein 2011). Though R2P has never attained de jure 
status, it is increasingly employed as a de facto standard used to advocate for the authorization of 
new missions and to evaluate existing operations (Oatley 2013).  
Despite growing agreement on the importance of civilian protection, gaps in understanding 
still exist among UN peacekeepers concerning how such norms might be implemented in eastern 
DRC. During my research, interview respondents – both UN staff and Congolese community 
members – expressed frustration at the lack of uniform standards for UN interventions in the 
name of civilian protection. Respondents added that no accountability mechanism requires 
peacekeepers to intervene.  
The absence of uniform understandings of intervention standards and the absence of a 
standard definition of “civilian protection” limit the ability of MONUSCO troops to intervene on 
behalf of civilians. One UN staff member commented on the consequences of a lack of clear 
guidelines by which to measure “civilian protection”: 
When we went out to the field, we would always get updates from peacekeepers on the 
security situation. We would ask what they were doing to protect the civilian population. A 
common answer was, “We do patrols on market days.” They would go in the car and patrol 
the market on specific days. To my understanding, this was not civilian protection. There is 
more to civilian protection than that. (UN Civilian Observer, interview, July 2014) 
Given a mandate to protect civilians, UN soldiers were not accountable for steps they did or 
did not take to do so. My interviews with Congolese community members and UN staff 
evidenced a lack of visible action steps taken to protect Congolese communities from latent 
violence. Whether inaction is attributable to a lack of uniform understanding of what “civilian 
protection” requires, as in the observation above, or to a lack of uniform will, the UN’s failure to 
articulate the parameters of “civilian protection” does Congolese civilians a disservice. A lack of 
evaluative benchmarks also undermines accountability: “Often we see situations in which people 
are fighting near UN troops and the troops do not intervene” (Congolese Community Member, 
interview, June 2014). 
At the organizational level, the mission’s geographic distribution of resources has limited 
MONUSCO’s capacity to effectively protect civilians. Today, many armed groups in the DRC 
operate in rural, sparsely populated areas in the country’s eastern provinces. In contrast, 
MONUSCO places a disproportionately large share of its resources in Kinshasa, the nation’s 
capital, located in the far west of the DRC. Additionally, mission resources and troops remain 
concentrated in urban provincial capitals such as Goma and Bukavu (MONUSCO 2014). 
Conversations with Congolese community members highlight the UN’s failure to prioritize areas 
in the greatest need of support. In the statements below, respondents observed a trend among 
peacekeepers to choose personal comfort over effective civilian protection. 
MONUSCO should go to places where atrocities are actually occurring, rather than 
remaining in town centers. They remain in the center of town because it is easier to access 
water there. (UN Interpreter, interview, July 2014)  
The UN lives in the best places. Compared to where civilians are living, they live much more 
comfortably. They do not seem to care about development or protecting civilians. When they 
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leave, we wonder what we will have to remember them by, because up to this time they have 
done nothing. (Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014) 
They do not go to the places where people are fighting. They do not go into the bush. 
(Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014)  
MONUSCO needs a stronger presence in the field, not just in Bukavu or Goma. In order to 
truly protect civilians there definitely needs to be a stronger presence in the field to gather 
information. We can’t simply have the peacekeepers remain at their bases without 
communicating with the civilian population. (UN Civilian Observer, interview, July 2014) 
MONUSCO plays a crucial role in contributing to the discrepancy between the 
overwhelmingly rural location of militia activity and the concentration of troops, which is 
disproportionately urban. Appendix A displays the geographic distribution of armed militias 
currently operating in the DRC. It must be noted that armed group activity remains limited to the 
Congolese provinces of Orientale, North Kivu, and South Kivu, and, to a lesser extent, Katanga. 
Each of these provinces lines the eastern edge of the DRC. Additionally, apart from the Kata-
Katanga armed group in Lubumbashi, in the Katanga province, no armed groups operate in 
provincial capitals and most armed groups reside outside major cities. Even in Katanga, armed 
groups remain concentrated in rural areas and launch only sporadic attacks on major cities like 
Lubumbashi (MONUSCO 2014).  
At the time of this writing, MONUSCO’s DRC headquarters are in Kinshasa, the country’s 
capital city, located about 1,500 miles from the capitals of North Kivu and South Kivu in eastern 
Congo. This is significant given that the country’s eastern provinces have experienced greater 
levels of instability. During the two Congo wars, from 1998 to 2003, Kinshasa itself underwent 
periods of conflict and occupation by foreign militants (Nzongola 2002; Stearns 2011). In the 
years since the war’s formal conclusion, relative peace has returned to Kinshasa. Conflict during 
the 2003–2014 period erupted not only in the nation’s capital, but also in its mineral-rich eastern 
provinces. The inherent shortcomings of MONUSCO’s “home base” location concern more than 
the 1,500 mile distance alone. The country’s east is accessible by way of Kinshasa only through 
air travel, and only on a singular national airline. Travel by road involves many delays due to the 
difficult terrain and unreliable roads, and cross-country automobile excursions may take months 
(Foster and Benitez 2011). In late spring 2014, the mission began a large-scale shift of resources 
from Kinshasa to Congo’s eastern provinces (UN Political Affairs Officer, interview, July 2014). 
This shift represents an overdue development, the tangible consequences of which remain to be 
seen.  
In addition to shortcomings around lack of uniformity in intervention standards and 
geographic organization of resources, assessments by UN staff and Congolese community 
representatives revealed a lack of uniformity in troop skill level and readiness, a systemic lack of 
commitment on the part of UN troops, and a lack of trust between UN troops and Congolese 
civilians: 
I do not think that it is realistic to expect troops to stay for longer than one year. While 
civilian MONUSCO staff may elect to devote their life’s work to Congo, for most military 
peacekeepers the Congo is simply a posting. (UN Civilian Observer, interview, July 2014) 
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How can we expect troops to die for a country that is not their own? (UN Language 
Consultant 2014) 
Regardless of the quality of high-level leadership, the degree of international political will, or 
the financial resources of the mission, the success of MONUSCO depends at least in part on the 
quality of peacekeeping troops. As one interviewee proposed, “The entire purpose of the UN is 
that it is a multinational organization, but this also makes it very difficult to manage” (UN 
Civilian Observer, interview, June 2014). Perceived lack of commitment on the part of individual 
UN troops undermines civilian trust in peacekeeping forces, making it difficult for the UN to 
operate collaboratively and thus more effectively. Additionally, as outlined below, structural 
injustices endemic in UN troop contribution and deployment also taint local perceptions of UN 
credibility. 
 
Country-Level Troop Contributions: Structural Racism in Peacekeeping? 
In considering country-level disparities among peacekeeping troops, concerns also arise 
regarding the potential for structural racism being embedded in the way in which the UN deploys 
peacekeeping forces. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 
the nations with the highest military expenditures include, in order of descending expenditure 
size: the United States (US), China, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and Japan. Together, 
these five nations accounted for 1,059 billion USD in military spending (of which the US 
accounted for over 50 percent, at 682 billion), or 60 percent of global military expenditures in 
2012. The US alone bore responsibility for nearly 40 percent of all military expenditures for that 
same year (SIPRI 2013). Of SIPRI’s top 5 military spenders, only China appeared among the UN 
peacekeeping’s top 15 troop contributing countries as of February 2015 (UN Peacekeeping 
2015a). Also in 2015, the US, while first in military spending, ranked 66 in troop contributions, 
with just 119 total military and police personnel serving in peacekeeping operations globally 
(UN Peacekeeping 2015a). As per the UN’s February 2015 report, the top 5 troop contributing 
nations include, in descending order: Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Ethiopia, and Rwanda (UN 
Peacekeeping 2015a). Of these 5 nations, only India was listed in SIPRI’s top 15 military 
spenders in 2012 (SIPRI 2013). In observing military expenditure data from SIPRI and troop 
contribution data from the UN, a key pattern emerges: overall, the countries spending the most to 
train and equip their own troops do not proportionately contribute military personnel to 
peacekeeping operations. Using military sending as a crude proxy for troop quality, the statistics 
cited above further corroborate interview responses from MONUSCO personnel, suggesting that 
overall discrepancies in troop quality have proven to be a hindrance to optimal mission 
functioning (UN Civilian Observer, interview, July 2014). Under-resourced and poorly trained 
troops struggle to meet the UN’s more demanding mandate. 
In addition, the numerical differences between country military spending and country troop 
contributions suggest a darker conclusion regarding the structural racism in UN peacekeeping. 
Countries with greater military capacity, on the whole, do not contribute in a meaningful way to 
peacekeeping operations, the vast majority of which are on the African continent. Of the UN’s 
sixteen active peacekeeping operations, just over half – nine out of sixteen – remain 
geographically situated on the African continent. This is twice the number situated in the Middle 
East, the second densest region in the world in terms of peacekeeping, which currently hosts four 
active missions. The European continent hosts only one active UN mission, the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). There are no active missions on the North 
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American continent (UN Peacekeeping 2015b). Taking these figures together with SIPRI data, it 
appears that the UN receives a disproportionately higher share of troop contributions from 
countries with relatively low levels of military spending. The UN then deploys these troops to its 
peacekeeping missions, over 50 percent of which operate on the African continent. In summary, 
a phenomenon arises whereby relatively poorly equipped troops bear the primary responsibility 
for international peacekeeping on the African continent. Examining military expenditures within 
the world’s wealthier, more militarized nations and the corresponding failure of these nations to 
leverage military capacity in service of peacekeeping, the structure of troop contributions and 
deployments is perhaps suggestive of a lack of will rooted in the comparative devaluation of 
African lives. 
 
Collaboration on the Ground: Poorly Placed Priorities 
MONUSCO does in fact expend effort to engage with the host government in the DRC. Thus, 
rather than there being an issue with an absolute lack of collaboration, problems arise with the 
ways in which MONUSCO chooses to prioritize its relationships with stakeholders. The 
mission’s preference for elite-level political consultations reflects the legacy of past UN 
operations in terms of their deference to host governments (Boutros-Ghali 1992; ICISS 2001). 
However, in the DRC, such consultations often serve to systemically exclude Congolese 
communities. While community members do in fact report efforts by MONUSCO to promote 
dialogue, these reports reveal that such consultations categorically lack substance. Community 
members do not witness their recommendations being put into practice by MONUSCO 
personnel. This has led some community members to conclude that the UN’s efforts to 
collaborate with Congolese communities amount to a shallow attempt to feign inclusion. As one 
community member said: “I meet them often at ceremonies. They hold different ceremonies 
where they serve food to people who attend” (Interview, June 2014). The respondent went on to 
state that the meetings referenced lacked any attempt at substantive consultation. 
Relative to political authorities, Congolese community members possess a much more 
comprehensive knowledge of the needs of Congolese civilians and the challenges that they face. 
Thus, to effectively protect civilians in eastern Congo, the UN must shift focus from high-level 
consultations with government officials to more frequent, transparent, and substantive 
collaborations with Congolese communities. Many interviewees expressed frustration with 
MONUSCO’s lack of community consultation: 
When they arrived, they did not consult us or ask our opinion. They simply came and starting 
working without asking what the population here needed. That is why they did not succeed. 
(Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014) 
When MONUSCO came, they signed a contract with the government…the government does 
not know what the Congolese population needs. If they made the contract with us, we could 
better advise them on what needs to be done. (Congolese Community Member, interview, 
June 2014) 
If MONUSCO came to us civilians, we could more accurately advise them on what they need 
to succeed and on what needs to be done. The problem is that they go to the government and 
the government does not know what we need. We recognize that they are not accomplishing 
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their mission but we do not necessarily know why. The government may have an answer to 
this question. (Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014) 
In the context of a lack of trust between the Congolese electorate and those elected to represent 
their interests, the preference on the part of the UN for high-level political negotiations becomes 
difficult to understand. Collegial relationships between UN personnel and local political officials 
are critical, but such relationships must not come at the expense of an equally collegial 
relationship with Congolese communities. Theoretically, one can argue that, in a society 
sufficiently democratic to presume that elected officials, on average, reliably represent the will of 
that society’s citizens, consistent consultation with those elected officials will go far in 
identifying and responding to the needs of the people. Where the democratic link is weaker, 
however, the relationship between elected officials and the electorate and their needs remains far 
less clear. One UN Team Leader of Interpreters insisted that: “Civil society must not stop until 
their voices are heard. Congolese citizens must continue denouncing atrocities in the presence of 
MONUSCO and must continue to push the Congolese government to fulfill its role in providing 
security. They must push for the new mandate to be implemented in practice; they must push for 
MONUSCO to respect its mandate” (Interview, July 2014). Effective peacekeeping is a 
collaborative effort; for MONUSCO to achieve its mandate, it must meet Congolese civil society 
halfway. 
 
Tourists in Blue Helmets: Shortchanging Congolese Civilians 
Despite minor improvements in mission capacity following the release of UNSC Resolution 
2098, MONUSCO displays a perpetual failure to meet its primary objective: the protection of 
Congolese civilians. This failure arises both from the internal limitations of MONUSCO as well 
as from complexities within the dynamics of collaboration between MONUSCO and the 
Congolese state. While perpetual shortfalls do cast doubt on the credibility of MONUSCO, UN 
peacekeeping, and perhaps even the UN as an organization, Congolese civilians stand to suffer 
the greatest losses if MONUSCO’s capacity to fulfill its objectives continues to fall short of its 
mandate. One Congolese national and former UN employee described the UN’s longstanding 
presence in his country as an “unfulfilled promise”: 
MONUSCO pretends to come and bring peace. What people expect them to do is to come 
and bring peace, but sometimes they have their own agenda. We are really in need of peace. 
In the east of Congo, we have a lot of problems and a lot of challenges. When we were told 
that there would be a mission devoted to all of these problems, we thought that maybe things 
would change. What we see in the field and what people are expecting are two very different 
things. (UN Language Consultant, interview, June 2014)  
This language consultant’s statement reflects a pervasive opinion among Congolese civilians that 
the UN fails to deliver on its promises. More alarmingly, the consultant suggests a discrepancy 
between MONUSCO’s explicit objectives and the mission’s underlying agenda.  
The consultant’s claims do not lack historical precedent, particularly in the Congolese case. 
In Toward an African Revolution, Frantz Fanon writes, “It is not true to say that the UN fails 
because the cases are difficult. In reality the UN is a legal card used by the imperialist interests 
when the card of brute force has failed” (1969, 195). Fanon here references the complicity of 
ONUC in Belgium’s neo-colonial occupation of Katanga province and other parts of the Congo 
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in the 1960s. In Lumumba Speaks (1961) and The Assassination of Lumumba (2001), Patrice 
Lumumba and Ludo De Witte, respectively, additionally implicate the UN as a key player in the 
US–Belgian plot to eliminate Congo’s first prime minister and inspire the rise of General 
Mobutu. The ONUC mission ostensibly operated in an effort to restore law and order following a 
succession of post-independence crises in July 1960: the Congolese National Army (Armée 
Nationale Congolaise, or ANC) mutiny, the secession of Katanga province under Moise 
Tshombe, and the subsequent occupation of the region by Belgian troops. In his capacity as 
Prime Minister, Lumumba initially requested UN intervention in response to Belgium’s violation 
of Congolese sovereignty (Lumumba 1961). The mission quickly deviated from its ostensibly 
neutral role, prolonging Belgian occupation and undermining Lumumba’s political authority (De 
Witte 2001; Lumumba 1961). 
While it is perhaps unfair to superimpose the sins of ONUC on its twenty-first century 
successor, MONUSCO, the criticisms of Fanon, De Witte, and Lumumba remain worthy of 
careful consideration, particularly given contemporary doubts regarding the UN’s motives in the 
Congo (Congolese community members, interview, June 2014; Nzongola 2012). The fact 
remains that the interests of powerful, wealthy countries prevail at the United Nations. For its 
part, the United States funds nearly 30 percent of the total UN peacekeeping budget (Power 
2015), while three out of the five permanent seats on the UNSC belong to Western governments 
(UNSC 2015). In this climate of disproportionate influence, scrutiny must be applied to the 
motives behind UN peacekeeping decisions. 
Whether due to a Western-dominated sub-agenda or, more benignly, to practical mission 
shortcomings, the fact remains that MONUSCO represents a perpetual unfulfilled promise to 
many Congolese civilians. At best, the mission’s well-meaning initiatives fall short of tangibly 
benefitting the Congolese people. At worst, MONUSCO represents a fifteen-year, billion-dollar 
façade, a mockery of peace where Congolese civilians remain the butt of a cruel joke. As one 
Congolese community member reported: “We can tell you about their mandate because we hear 
what they tell us in the different meetings we attend. But if you ask other civilians who do not 
attend these meetings, they will tell you that MONUSCO troops are like tourists. They just come 
to visit and to steal riches from Congo. They are ‘working’ but they are not doing anything” 
(Interview, June 2014). 
While the comparison of UN peacekeepers to tourists might exaggerate the nature of 
MONUSCO’s inadequacy, the reflection by this community member channels years of 
frustration on the part of Congolese civilians in response to the unfulfilled promise of peace. 
Since the nearly one and a half years since MONUSCO’s 2013 mandate granted the mission 
increased power and authority to protect civilians in eastern DRC, the slow rate of progress 
suggests that the mission is on track to yet another failed promise. If the international community 
is to make good on its promise to work with the DRC toward sustainable peace, MONUSCO 
cannot afford to neglect its internal shortcomings, nor can it fail to reform its strategy for 
working collaboratively with Congolese institutions. 
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Appendix A. Map Showing Armed Group Presence in the DRC 
 
Source: MONUSCO. 2015. La MONUSCO en un Clin d’œil. [MONUSCO at a Glance]. (April). 
https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2015-04-16_global_factsheet_fre.pdf. 
 
